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•Chapter e ight
Questions, Questions:  
Has Weber Had an Impact on Unions’ 
Representational Responsibilities in 
Workplace Human Rights Disputes?
Claire Mummé
 INTRODUCTION
Union representation in Canada is premised on strength in num-
bers — the collective makes each member stronger. But collective rep-
resentation, by its nature, can also produce tension between collective 
and individual rights and interests. A recurring theme of Bernie Adell’s 
scholarship was a concern for how best to balance this tension.1 He was, 
in particular, critical of the union’s veto over access to labour arbitration, 
* My sincere thanks to the organizers and participants in the CLCW’s Weber Con-
ference for a great few days of conversation, and useful comments on this essay. 
Thanks in particular to anonymous reviewers for some very helpful nuances, to 
Renée-Claude Drouin for providing me with a better sense of the legal context in 
Quebec, to Aaron Bhogossian and Tori-Lee Jenkins for helpful research assistance, 
and to Elizabeth Shilton for her ongoing support and intellectual engagement.
1 BL Adell, “The Duty of Fair Representation — Effective Protection for Individual 
Rights in Collective Agreements?” (1970) 25:3 Relations industrielles/Industrial 
Relations 602; Bernard Adell, “Collective Agreements and Individual Rights: A 
Note on the Duty of Fair Representation” (1986) 11:2 Queen’s Law Journal 251 [Adell, 
“Collective Agreements”]; Bernard Adell, “Jurisdictional Overlap Between Arbitra-
tion and Other Forums: An Update” (2000) 8 Canadian Labour and Employment 
Law Journal 179 [Adell, “Jurisdictional Overlap”]; Bernard Adell, “The Duty of Fair 
Representation: ‘a form of words . . .’?,” (PowerPoint delivered at Adjudicating Hu-
man Rights in the Workplace After the Pinto Report, Where Do We Go Next?, CLCW 
Workshop, Queen’s University, 10 November 2012)) [unpublished]. 
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suggesting in 1985 that the veto provided unions with too much power 
over important personal rights.2 For this reason, he suggested, members 
ought to have the right to bring forward a grievance to arbitration at their 
own cost if the union refused to do so. Adell reiterated that concern after 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s 1995 decision in Weber which, he thought, 
served to compound the tensions unions must manage between individ-
ual and collective rights.3 
There has been much commentary on Weber, and on the Supreme 
Court’s subsequent 2004 decision in Parry Sound (District) Welfare Ad-
ministration Board v Ontario Public Service Employees Union Local 324.4 
Concerns raised include the impact of these decisions on the institution 
of labour arbitration, the more general implications of merging legal re-
gimes focused on individual rights into a system premised on collective 
representation, the potential for diminution of the individual rights of 
unionized employees, and the costs to unions associated with expanded 
arbitral jurisdiction.5 Human rights issues have been at the centre of 
2 Adell, “Collective Agreements” at 255–58.
3 Adell, “Jurisdictional Overlap,” above note 1 at 224–29; Weber v Ontario Hydro [1995] 
2 SCR 929 [Weber]. 
4 2003 SCC 42 [Parry Sound]. 
5 Some of these issues are discussed in other chapters in this volume. See also Ronald 
Pink & DC Wallbridge, “The Future of Labour Arbitration” (Paper delivered at The 
2010 Administrative, Labour and Employment and Privacy and Access Conference, 
Ottawa, 26–27 November 2010) (2010) Canadian Bar Association; Fay Faraday, 
“The Expanding Scope of Arbitration: Mainstreaming Human Rights Values and 
Remedies” (2005) 12 Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal 355; Andrew 
K Lokan & Maryth Yachnin, “From Weber to Parry Sound: The Expanded Scope of 
Arbitration” (2004) 11 Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal 1; John-Paul 
Alexandrowicz, “Restoring the Role of Grievance Arbitration: A New Approach to 
Weber” (2003) 10 Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal 269; Adell, “Juris-
dictional Overlap,” above note 1; Richard MacDowell, “Labour Arbitration — The 
New Labour Court?” (2000) 8 Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal 121; 
Brian Etherington, “Promises, Promises: Notes on Diversity and Access to Justice” 
(2000) 26:1 Queen’s Law Journal 43; Donald Carter, “Looking at Weber Five Years 
Later: Is it Time for a New Approach?” (2000) 8 Canadian Labour and Employment 
Law Journal 231; Michel G Picher, “Defining the Scope of Arbitration: The Impact of 
Weber: An Arbitrator’s Perspective” in Kevin Whitaker et al, eds, (1999–2000) 1 La-
bour Arbitration Year Book (Toronto: Lancaster House, 2000) 99; Raymond Brown 
& Brian Etherington. “Weber v Ontario Hydro: A Denial of Access to Justice for the 
Organized Employee” (1996) 4 Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal 183. 
For a defence of exclusive arbitral jurisdiction, see Peter Gall, Andrea Zwack and 
Katie Bayne, “Determining Human Rights Issues in the Unionized Workplace: The 
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much of both the debate and the jurisprudence concerning expanded 
arbitral jurisdiction. But one problem that has received less attention is 
the impact of Weber and Parry Sound on the nature and extent of unions’ 
human rights representational obligations in the administration of the 
collective bargaining agreement.6 Examining how unions are handling 
their representational role in regards to members’ human rights requires, 
for the most part, answering a series of empirical questions — questions 
that are not easily resolved through a study of caselaw.
This essay attempts to put forward a research agenda for properly 
evaluating the changing nature of unions’ human rights representational 
obligations since Weber. I begin by investigating two legal questions: first, 
whether unions are held to a more stringent duty of fair representation 
(DFR) standard in regards to members’ discrimination grievances than 
prior to Weber and Parry Sound, and second, whether there has been a 
broadening of the concept of union discrimination under human rights 
codes, such that unions may be held liable for failing to bring forward 
discrimination grievances. With the legal picture in place, I then set out a 
series of empirical questions that need further research to properly assess 
whether, and to what extent, Weber and Parry Sound have altered unions’ 
human rights obligations in the administration of collective agreements, 
and more generally, their approaches to dealing with human rights issues 
in the workplace. The essay intentionally raises more questions than it 
answers, with the objective of provoking further research on important 
issues regarding labour law in action.
Case for Exclusive Jurisdiction” (2005) 12 Canadian Labour and Employment Law 
Journal 381. 
6 For one notable exception, see Yves-Christian Ménard, La discrimination en milieu 
de travail et le devoir juridique de représentation syndicale: une analyse socio-juri-
dique (LLM Thesis, Université de Montréal Faculté des études supiérieures, 2011) 
[unpublished]. See also Elizabeth Shilton, “ ‘Everybody’s Business’: Human Rights 
Enforcement and the Union’s Duty to Accommodate” (2014) 18:1 Canadian Labour 
and Employment Law Journal 209, which touches upon unions’ human rights respon-
sibilities in the negotiation of collective agreements, an issue I do not examine here. 
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A. THE IMPACT OF WEBER AND PARRY SOUND ON THE BALANCE 
BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RIGHTS OF 
UNIONIZED WORKERS
The details of the SCC’s decisions in Weber and Parry Sound are addressed 
elsewhere in this volume,7 and will not be repeated here. Much of the ear-
ly discussion on the significance of Weber focused on the practical strains 
placed on unions and on the labour arbitration process by the expansion 
of exclusive arbitral jurisdiction.8 The concerns triggered by Weber were 
magnified after the SCC’s decision in Parry Sound, which, for a time at 
least, seemed to significantly expand arbitrators’ exclusive jurisdiction 
as regards statutory employment rights, and in particular human rights 
claims.9 
Weber and Parry Sound provided clear benefits to employers. Expanded 
exclusive arbitral jurisdiction reduced the number of fora in which an 
employer could be sued. And because the principle of exclusivity endows 
unions with control over access to labour arbitration, the employer could 
now deal with only one party (the union) to negotiate settlements over a 
broader swath of legal claims. Moreover, the union would likely exercise 
a disciplining force in deciding which grievances were brought forward, 
thereby reducing the number of weak and frivolous claims faced by the 
employer. 
For employees, Weber was a mixed bag. On the one hand, a single deci-
sion-maker could now resolve most of their work-related claims. Moreover, 
workers would now have the benefit of union representation and cost-free 
7 See e.g., Brian Etherington, “Weber, and Almost Everything After, 20 Years Later: Its 
Impact on Individual Charter, Common Law and Statutory Rights Claims,” Chapter 2. 
8 See sources above note 5.
9 The outcome in Parry Sound itself can be explained relatively uncontroversially 
as a simple application of s 48(12)(j) of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO 
1995, c 1, Schedule A [OLRA], which grants arbitrators the power “to interpret and 
apply human rights and other employment-related statutes, despite any conflict be-
tween those statutes and the terms of the collective agreement.” But the Court went 
farther to hold that statutory human rights obligations are effectively incorporated 
as terms of the collective agreement. Combined with the Supreme Court’s expan-
sive understanding in Weber of what constitutes matters that “in their essential 
character, arise from the interpretation, application, administration or violation of 
the collective agreement” (Weber, above note 3 at para 57), Parry Sound appeared 
to significantly increase the scope of exclusive arbitral jurisdiction over employ-
ment-related statutes that had previously been enforceable in other forums.
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(at least to individuals) legal proceedings rather than paying for the costs 
of legal action and legal representation themselves. They would also have 
the strength of the collective at their backs. On the other hand, because the 
union decides which grievances to bring forward to arbitration, unionized 
employees would now not have carriage over important individual rights 
claims, with the potential that those claims would not be resolved at all. For 
commentators such as Adell, this last concern was particularly acute as 
regards workplace discrimination issues.
The impact of Weber on unions differed depending on their size and 
individual histories. Long before Weber and Parry Sound, some unions 
had bargained human rights provisions into their collective agreements. 
And it was clear since McLeod v Egan10 that employment-related statutes 
could be applied at arbitration to the interpretation of collective bar-
gaining agreements, a principle further solidified in Ontario by the addi-
tion of section 48(12)(j) to the Labour Relations Act in 1995.11 What Weber 
and Parry Sound changed was the scope of what would be considered a 
matter arising out of a collective bargaining agreement, and therefore 
subject to exclusive arbitral jurisdiction. This mattered, amongst other 
reasons, because the twin principles of majoritarianism and exclusivity 
serve to appoint unions as the exclusive representative of the bargaining 
unit, with control over access to the grievance process and arbitration.12 
To the extent that labour arbitration now appeared to be the exclusive 
forum for adjudicating an increasing number of members’ individual 
rights claims, scholars wondered whether unions would now face height-
ened scrutiny under the DFR, and thus face pressure to account more 
stringently for the ways they determined the appropriate balance be-
tween individual and collective interests.13
To be clear, tensions between individual and collective interests were 
not new. Collective representation requires managing disparate and 
sometimes conflicting interests amongst members. The new question 
was whether Weber would serve to heighten such tensions, particularly 
10 (1974), [1975] 1 SCR 517, 46 DLR (3d) 150 [McLeod].
11 OLRA, above note 9.
12 How this works is well explained in Judd v Communications, Energy and Paperwork-
ers Union of Canada Local 2000, [2003] BCLRBD No 63, 2003 CLLC 220-055 [Judd].
13 Bernard Adell, “The Union’s Duty of Fair Representation in Discrimination Cases: 
The New Obligation to be Proactive” in Kevin Whitaker et al, eds, (2000–2001) 1 
Labour Arbitration Year Book (Toronto: Lancaster House, 2002) 263 at 264 [Adell, 
“The Union’s DFR”]. 
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for smaller, less well-funded unions, by directing an increasing number of 
disputes concerning statutory and common law workplace rights to labour 
arbitration, access to which was determined by the union. Would the union 
now face greater scrutiny in regards to its duty of fair representation when, 
for instance, the only way to accommodate a member with a disability 
was to disregard the seniority list, thereby displacing the rights of other 
members? Would it change the way unions dealt with situations where 
one member accused another of discrimination, and the union had to rep-
resent the interests of both? And what would be the cost implications of 
the expanding zone of member rights to be resolved at labour arbitration? 
In an article on Weber penned in 2000, Adell noted:
The increasingly frequent links between anti-discrimination rights, which 
are vested in individuals, and the collective agreement administration 
process, which privileges collective rights, threaten to put very heavy 
pressure on the DFR both in theory and in practice. Those pressures 
are further aggravated by the various lines of jurisprudence stemming 
from Weber v. Ontario Hydro . . . [T]hat jurisprudence is giving unions 
and the grievance arbitration process an as yet ill-defined range of new 
responsibilities for enforcing employee rights (and duties) previously 
enforced in other forums . . . .14
Weber addressed itself to the jurisdictional relationship between com-
mon law courts and statutory tribunals. The issue of competing jurisdic-
tion between statutory tribunals was addressed a few years later in Québec 
(Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Québec 
(Procureur général).15 There the majority of the Court modified the Weber 
analysis in the context of competing statutory tribunals, holding that it 
was first necessary to examine the nature of the jurisdictional grant of au-
thority to each tribunal to determine whether one or other held exclusive 
jurisdiction, or whether their jurisdiction was concurrent. If jurisdiction 
was concurrent, one should then determine which tribunal was the best 
fit in the circumstances. The Morin majority was attracted to this more 
flexible approach at least in part from a concern that unions may, in some 
circumstances, be opposed in interest to some of their members.16 The 
decision implied (although it did not decide) that where the union deter-
14 Adell, “Jurisdictional Overlap,” above note 1 at 223.
15 2004 SCC 39 [Morin]. 
16 Ibid at para 28.
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mined that the balance tipped in favour of collective rather than individ-
ual interests, a path to adjudication other than labour arbitration should 
be available to individual employees.
Two years after Morin, the Supreme Court of Canada held in 
Tranchemontagne v Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program) that all 
statutory decision-makers endowed with the power to decide questions 
of fact and law have the authority to interpret and apply human rights 
codes.17 Although Morin still formally controls, after Tranchemontagne 1 
most decision-makers no longer engage in the second step of the Morin 
analysis, concluding a priori that labour arbitrators and human rights 
tribunals share concurrent jurisdiction over the human rights claims of 
unionized employees. Instead, most decision-makers focus on attempt-
ing to control multiple proceedings before concurrent tribunals through 
issue estoppel and res judicata principles.18 
One might have thought that the adoption of a concurrency model 
would lessen the weight of unions’ representational obligations. In theory, 
the concurrency model allows for a unionized employee either to pur-
sue a grievance through the union to arbitration, or to bring her claim 
independently to a human rights commission or tribunal. In practice, in 
Ontario at least, that choice has been realizable since the abolition of 
the Ontario Human Rights Commission’s gatekeeping function, and the 
institution of direct access to the Human Rights Tribunal in 2006.19 But 
as Elizabeth Shilton has convincingly argued, there are strong pressures 
17 2006 SCC 14 [Tranchemontagne 1].
18 The Supreme Court issued two recent decisions on the application of issue estop-
pel in the context of competing statutory tribunals; British Columbia (Workers’ 
Compensation Board) v Figliola, 2011 SCC 52, and Penner v Niagara (Regional Police 
Services Board), 2013 SCC 19. There continues to be uncertainty in the caselaw, and 
within the Court, about how to balance the principles of fairness and of finality 
when dealing with overlapping tribunal jurisdiction. For a short but interesting 
analysis of the relationship between these two decisions, see Paul Daly, “Does 
Penner Overrule Figliola? What’s the Canadian Law on Issue Estoppel?” (11 April 
2013) Administrative Law Matters (blog), online, www.administrativelawmatters.
com/blog/2013/04/11/does-penner-overrule-figliola-whats-the-canadian-law-on- 
issue-estoppel. For an analysis of Figliola’s labour impact see Shilton, above note 6 
at 236–239. For a consideration of Figliola from a human rights perspective, see La-
verne Jacobs, “Figliola: Competing Jurisdiction, Shared Governance, and Protecting 
Human Rights in the Canadian Administrative State,” online: (2013) Social Science 
Research Network http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2184585.
19 Shilton, above note 6 at 234–35; Etherington, above note 5 at 51–62.
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that push unionized employees to arbitration rather than human rights 
tribunals.20 In many instances collective bargaining agreements may of-
fer greater rights and protections than human rights codes. For example, 
the collective agreement may provide stronger accommodation language 
than the undue hardship standard imbedded in the human rights code. 
Or the agreement’s “just cause” and progressive discipline requirements 
may impose greater obligations on the employer than provided by the 
code. Or there may be issues at play in addition to the discrimination 
claim which would be resolvable at arbitration, but over which a human 
rights tribunal does not have jurisdiction. For a host of reasons, therefore, 
it may be more beneficial for a unionized employee to proceed to arbi-
tration than to bring a human rights claim to a tribunal.21 The benefits of 
arbitration are attested to by the fact that the number of discrimination 
grievances decided by arbitrators does not appear to have diminished 
since Morin and Tranchemontagne 1.22 What, then, are the legal principles 
that animate unions’ obligations towards their members’ human rights 
disputes?
B. UNIONS’ POST-WEBER LEGAL OBLIGATIONS REGARDING 
WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION 
As already mentioned, it was clear prior to Weber that unions had import-
ant human rights obligations in the workplace. Since McLeod, arbitrators 
have been required to consider human rights principles in their interpreta-
tion of collective bargaining agreements.23 In Ontario, this power was given 
explicit statutory support in 1994 with the addition of section 48(12)(j) 
of the OLRA.24 And in 1992, in Central Okanagan District School No 23 v 
Renaud, the Supreme Court held that in addition to employers, unions 
20 Shilton, ibid at 235–40.
21 See Shilton, ibid, for a discussion of a unionized employee’s options and their differ-
ing consequences under a system of concurrency between labour arbitration and 
human rights tribunals. Of course employees’ decision-making in such instances 
is not always well informed, and there is always a risk of making forum choices 
without the benefit of a clear sense of the consequences. 
22 Bernie Adell observed at the Inaugural Innis Christie Symposium at Dalhousie 
University in 2010 that the 4th Series of the LACs should be known as the “human 
rights series.” See Pink & Wallbridge, above note 5 at 5.
23 McLeod, above note 10.
24 OLRA, above note 9.
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also owe a duty to accommodate workers in the workplace under human 
rights legislation.25 Although it is the employer that is primarily respon-
sible for ensuring a discrimination-free workplace, the Court in Renaud 
held that in limited circumstances a union could also be directly liable 
for discrimination under human rights codes. This could occur where 
the union participated with the employer in negotiating discriminatory 
collective bargaining provisions, or where the union impeded employers’ 
legitimate attempts to accommodate a union member. Finally, through the 
duty of fair representation, unions were required to represent all members 
in good faith, and in a non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory manner.26 
The first question then is whether, since Weber and Parry Sound, 
unions have faced greater scrutiny of their duty of fair representation 
when deciding not to bring forward, or to settle, a human rights grievance. 
The second is whether there has been greater scope for unions’ direct 
liability under human rights codes in such situations.
1) The Post-Weber DFR Standard
At the time Weber was decided, the Supreme Court’s most current state-
ments on the DFR were contained in two cases decided in 1990, Gendron v 
Supply & Services Union of Public Service Alliance of Canada, Local 50057,27 
and Centre hospitalier Régina Ltée v Québec (Tribunal du travail).28 Since 
then, the Court has issued only one decision on the DFR, and the princi-
ples have remained constant.29 
The duty of fair representation acts as a check on the principle of ex-
clusivity. The union’s role as the exclusive representative of the employees 
in the bargaining unit endows it with the discretion to determine which 
matters to take forward to arbitration, and to determine when and on 
what terms to settle disputes with the employer. But that discretion must 
be exercised in good faith, without discrimination or arbitrariness. In 
Gendron the Court explained that “while the union’s status as exclusive 
bargaining agent operates to counteract the economic power of the em-
ployer, and therefore works to the benefit of those represented, it was 
25 [1992] 2 SCR 970, 95 DLR (4th) 577 [Renaud].
26 OLRA, above note 9, s 74.
27 [1990] 1 SCR 1298, 21 ACWS (3d) 289 [Gendron]
28 [1990] 1 SCR 1330, 69 DLR (4th) 609 [Centre Hospitalier].
29 Noël v Société d’énergie de la Baie James, 2001 SCC 39 [Noel].
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nevertheless necessary to ensure that unions wielded their power fairly.”30 
The DFR is therefore a protective legal mechanism afforded to individual 
members to hold unions accountable for the ways in which they deter-
mine the needs of the collective, and when to pursue matters on behalf of 
individual members. 
Bad faith arises where there is hostility or animus towards the em-
ployee.31 Arbitrariness arises where unions’ decisions are not based on a 
thorough study of the facts and the content of the agreement, where the 
significance of the grievance and of the consequence for the employee 
are not taken into consideration, and/or where serious negligence mars 
the decision-making process.32 Discrimination is defined as differential 
treatment without a legitimate labour relations purpose; for the pur-
poses of the DFR, discrimination therefore encompasses both grounds 
prohibited by human rights statutes and other types of non-justifiable 
differential treatment.33 The DFR, however, does not impose a standard 
of perfection, or even of reasonableness. The Boards and the courts ac-
knowledge that when they are balancing the interests of many, unions 
cannot function with constant scrutiny over every decision. They have 
the right to be wrong and to make mistakes, so long as their decisions are 
reasoned, not arbitrary, in bad faith or discriminatory.34
The DFR principles have remained relatively unchanged since Rayon-
ier, and the SCC’s approval of the Rayonier principles in Gagnon in 1984.35 
Nonetheless, in 2001 Adell identified some decisions suggesting that 
labour boards had begun to assess the DFR standard more stringently in 
regards to unions’ decisions not to bring forward discrimination griev-
ances. He suggested that there was an increasing jurisprudential move 
30 Gendron, above note 27 at para 28.
31 Rayonier Canada (BC) Ltd v International Woodworkers of America, Local 1-217, 
[1975] BCLRBD no 42, [1975] 2 Can LRBR 196 at paras 15–17 [Rayonier].
32 Judd, above note 12 at paras 58–70.
33 Rayonier, above note 31 at para 17.
34 Ibid at para 24. In Chrysler Canada Ltd, [1999] OLRB Rep July/August 757, [1999] 
OLRD No 2454 [Switzer Grievance] the Ontario Labour Relations Board, discussing 
the DFR standard, stated, “So long as it acts honestly, objectively and gives due 
consideration to matters which fall within the ambit of its responsibility as exclu-
sive bargaining agent, a union will not be held to account if it makes a mistake or a 
simple error in judgment. A union has a sort of limited ‘right to be wrong’.” Ibid at 
para 21.
35 Canadian Merchant Service Guild v Gagnon, [1984] 1 SCR 509, 9 DLR (4th) 641.
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towards requiring unions to be more proactive in their representation 
when a member raised a human rights issue in the workplace.36 
In a number of DFR proceedings in the late 1990s, labour boards sug-
gested that unions may have a duty to be more proactive in their rep-
resentation of members with psychological disabilities. The first such case, 
as Adell noted, was H(K) v Communications, Energy and Paperworkers 
Union, Local 1-S,37 a decision issued by the Saskatchewan Labour Relations 
Board in 1997. There a grievor was subject to escalating discipline for a 
series of incidents that were the product of a depression from which he 
suffered. There were serious disagreements between his physician and 
that of the employer, which led the employer to request an independent 
third examination. The Board noted that while there was no provision in 
the collective bargaining agreement requiring a third party examination 
in this type of situation, the union had nevertheless agreed to the employ-
er’s request and pushed the grievor to submit despite his doctor’s concerns. 
The Board also found problematic the union’s failure to challenge the ap-
propriateness of a progressive discipline framework for dealing with the 
grievor’s situation. The Board ultimately concluded that while the union’s 
approach might have been acceptable in general, by not taking into ac-
count the specific circumstances of the grievor’s disability the union dis-
criminated against him in violation of its duty of fair representation.
The Board’s concern in H(K) was that the union failed to recognize the 
effects of the psychological disability on the grievor, and the disability’s re-
lationship both to the alleged misconduct, and to the grievor’s interactions 
with the union or employer. In other words, the union’s obligation to be 
more proactive in its representation arose because of the nature of the 
grievor’s illness, and not because his dispute with the employer involved a 
discrimination claim or other “critical job interest.” However, other cases 
have applied a duty to be proactive in cases simply on the basis that the 
dispute involved a disability.38 Most notably, in 2004 in Bingley v Team-
sters, Local 91,39 the Canadian Industrial Relations Board (CIRB) imposed 
an obligation on the union to be proactive in a case involving a courier 
who suffered from a form of skin cancer, and who sought a reduction in 
the hours of her shift as a temporary accommodation to minimize sun 
36 Adell, “The Union’s DFR,” above note 13.
37 [1997] Sask LRBR 476, 98 CCLC 220-020 [H(K)]. 
38 Haggith v Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 401, [2001] BCLRBD No 273, 
[2001] LVI 3212-6 [Haggith].
39 [2004] CIRB No 291, [2004] CIRBD No 32 [Bingley].
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exposure. When she was denied the accommodation, her union filed a 
grievance that was ultimately resolved prior to arbitration. Bingley there-
after sought to bring a second grievance to secure back pay for wages lost 
during the period without accommodation. The union refused to bring 
forward the second grievance, and she brought a DFR claim against the 
union. 
The CIRB began its analysis by noting that the duty of fair representa-
tion and the human rights duty to accommodate are related but distinct 
duties. It then examined a number of cases, including H(K), which sug-
gested that where a DFR complaint arises from a union’s failure to bring 
forward an accommodation grievance, a more searching analysis of the 
union’s decision-making is appropriate:
Due to the sensitive and important issues associated with the accom-
modation of disabled workers in the workplace, labour boards also 
look to see whether unions have given disabled employees’ grievances 
greater scrutiny. The cases generally concur that the usual procedure 
applied to other members of the bargaining unit may be insufficient in 
representing a grievor with a disability, mainly because the member’s 
situation will require a different approach.40
The union must not, therefore handle a disability grievance in the 
“ordinary” manner. “[I]t must be proactive and more attentive in its ap-
proach.”41 The CIRB effectively assessed the union’s actions and decisions 
on a standard of reasonableness, a standard labour boards have assidu-
ously avoided in applying the DFR more generally.42 So long as the union 
was “reasonably careful and reasonably assertive,” the Board stated, it 
would not “worry about whether [its] decision not to pursue a grievance 
is correct on the language of the collective agreement, or even on the 
language of the applicable human rights statute.”43 The CIRB then went 
on to list a number of criteria to consider when assessing the DFR in 
disability discrimination cases: (a) whether the union’s intervention was 
reasonable where the employer failed to implement appropriate accom-
modation measures; (b) whether the quality of the process that allowed 
the union to come to its conclusion was reasonable; (c) whether the union 
went beyond its “usual” procedures and applied an extra measure of 
40 Ibid at para 64.
41 Ibid at para 74.
42 Rayonnier, above note 31.
43 Bingley, above note 39 at para 83.
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care in representing the employee; and (d) whether the union applied 
an extra measure of assertiveness in dealing with the employer. These 
criteria seem to combine concern that grievors with both physical and 
psychological disabilities might suffer specific difficulties in undertaking 
the grievance process itself, and concern about the serious nature of dis-
crimination-related claims. Applying this approach, the CIRB concluded 
that the union had not been sufficiently proactive or assertive. Accord-
ingly, it had discriminated against Bingley and thus violated its duty of 
fair representation. The CIRB ordered the union to pay the employee’s 
costs. It also ordered the parties to attempt to settle the matter, remain-
ing seized if no settlement was reached. 
In general, the CIRB attempted to preserve the distinction between 
the DFR (over which it has jurisdiction) and the union’s duty to accommo-
date (over which it does not). However, in discussing the principles applic-
able to the duty to accommodate, it arguably expanded on the principles 
enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Renaud by suggesting 
that unions could be directly liable simply for failing to bring forward a 
discrimination grievance. As previously noted, the Court in Renaud iden-
tified two scenarios in which a union could be liable for discrimination 
under human rights codes: where the union has agreed to a discriminatory 
practice or where it unreasonably impedes employer accommodation. As 
the Court explained, the “union’s responsibility is engaged when it causes 
or takes part in the work policy that is the source of the discriminatory 
act against the employee, such as a provision contained in the collective 
agreement.”44 In Bingley, however, the Board appeared to contemplate a 
third scenario in which unions may be liable: “The union’s responsibility 
may also be engaged when it does not address the discrimination even 
though it did not cause or take part in the discriminatory work policy. . . . 
A union may be held responsible for the discriminatory effects of an em-
ployment policy decision by not seeking to put an end to the discrimina-
tion.”45 This observation was clearly obiter in Bingley, and to date, does not 
appear to have been embraced either federally or in any province; indeed, 
as discussed below, it has been specifically disavowed in Ontario.46 
44 Renaud, above note 25.
45 Bingley, above note 39 at para 59, 61.
46 See the discussion of Gungor v Canadian Auto Workers Local 88, 2011 HRTO 1760 
(CanLII) [Gungor], below.
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Bingley has been discussed in a number of DFR cases since it was 
issued, but only rarely applied.47 The principles enunciated in Bingley 
have received the most thorough treatment in a 2010 decision called 
Schwartzmann v Manitoba Government and General Employees’ Union.48 
In Schwartzmann, the Manitoba Labour Board expressed approval of the 
principles set out in Bingley, and went on to refine them. It linked human 
rights issues with the existing DFR jurisprudence regarding “critical job 
interests,” and added discrimination disputes to the existing categories of 
issues, such as terminations, which deserve special attention because of 
their particular significance to employee interests: “[i]n the circumstance 
of a disabled employee alleging a violation of statutory anti-discrimin-
ation rights, the employment interests are serious and any associated 
grievance may have enormous consequences for the employee.”49 Because 
human rights issues are critical job interests, the Board held, unions need 
to take a more proactive role in assisting employees to understand their 
rights and responsibilities, and in obtaining the necessary medical reports, 
particularly where their disability makes doing so more difficult.50 On the 
facts before it, however, the Board found that the union had met this more 
exacting standard, and thus lived up to its duty of fair representation. 
Drawing upon the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Parry Sound, 
the Commission des Relations du Travail of Quebec has also held that 
unions must undertake a more proactive approach in assisting members 
with human rights issues in the workplace.51 In Chuuon c Association des 
47 Oliver and Nape, Re, [2012] LRBD No 10; Schwartzman v Manitoba Government and 
General Employees’ Union, [2010] MLBD No 49, 190 CLRBR (2d) 184 [Schwartzman]; 
Gough v United Steelworkers of America, Local 1976, 2010 CIRB 534, [2010] CIRBD No 
39; Pepper v Teamsters, Local 879, 2009 CIRB 453, [2010] CIRBD No 22; Jakutavicius 
v Public Service Alliance of Canada, 2005 PSLRB 70; Mallet v Canadian Brotherhood 
of Railway, Transport and General Workers, 2014 CIRB 730, 259 CLRBR (2d) 257 [Mal-
let]; Phillips & Temro Co (Re), [2013] MLBD No 31, 235 CLRBR (2d) 195 [Phillips]. 
48 Schwartzman, ibid.
49 Ibid at para 117.
50 Ibid at para 119. See also Gendron, above note 27, for a discussion of the role of criti-
cal job interests in assessing the union’s DFR; and Banks v Canadian Union of Public 
Employees, Local 4828, [2013] SLRBD No 20, where the employee unsuccessfully 
argued that harassment (not based on a prohibited ground) constitutes a critical 
interest. 
51 Nancy Martel & Pierre E Moreau, Le devoir de juste représentation (Montréal: 
LexisNexis Canada, 2009) at 87–88. On January 1, 2016, the Commission des rela-
tions du travail of Quebec was renamed the Tribunal administratif du travail.
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employés du Groupe Holiday Inc the Commission held that when a griev-
ance concerns a members’ discrimination claim, the union is obliged to 
intervene, to be proactive, to deploy additional efforts and to be particu-
larly sensitive in the manner of representation.52 
Ontario, however, has not experimented with a heightened DFR 
standard in regards to human rights claims. As Adell noted in 2001, the 
Ontario Labour Relations Board issued two decisions around the same 
time as H(K) suggesting that unions had a right to be wrong in regards to 
discrimination grievances, just as with any other grievance. In Gen-Auto 
Shippers the Board held that the union did not violate the DFR when it 
refused to grieve the application of a rule that placed workers at the bot-
tom of a seniority list when they temporarily moved job classifications. 
The employee in this case had moved to another classification because of 
an injury that interfered with his ability to perform the duties of his as-
signed classification. The Board found that the union was justified in de-
ciding in favour of the interests of the collective that benefited from the 
rule, because it was not plainly obvious that the rule violated the Human 
Rights Code.53 The Board applied the same reasoning in the same year in 
Thunder Bay Hydro, in which it upheld a union’s decision not to challenge 
a “last chance” agreement on human rights grounds, again because it was 
not clear on its face that the agreement violated the code.54 The issue of 
whether or not there is a higher DFR standard in discrimination cases 
has not received significant treatment in Ontario since the late 1990s.55 
There is therefore some general support for the idea that unions must 
be particularly proactive in dealing with members’ disability-related 
grievances. Manitoba and Quebec appear to recognize such an obligation, 
52 2005 QCCRT 115 at para 46. See also Maltais c Section locale 22 du syndicat canadien 
des communications, de l’énergie et du papier (SCEP), 2006 QCCRT 316; Syndicat des 
fonctionnaires municipaux de Montréal (SCFP) c Commission des relations du travail, 
2009 QCCS 4456. 
53 Mason v Gen-Auto Shippers &Teamsters, Local 938, [1999] OLRB 242, [1999] OLRD 
No 664 [Mason].
54 Creed v International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 339, [1999] OLRD No 
3422 [Creed].
55 Both Mason and Creed were recently cited in Sysco Food Services of Toronto, [2016] 
OLRD No 465. However, in that case the OLRB concluded that even if a duty to 
be proactive applied, the union had met the higher standard applicable in termi-
nation scenarios of providing a “persuasive account” of its reasoning, based on 
the well-founded nature of the legal opinion and the union’s careful review of the 
merits of the case.
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and Bingley has received some positive treatment elsewhere,56 but On-
tario has not followed suit. Outside of Quebec, the duty to be proactive, 
where it is accepted, is recognized only in disability cases, although some 
of its analysis is arguably applicable to other grounds of discrimination. 
At a general level, then, a higher standard of investigation may be re-
quired in regards to disability discrimination, but no overall change has 
otherwise occurred in the DFR caselaw since Weber and Parry Sound in 
the standards applied to union handling of human rights issues.
2) Human Rights Claims against Unions before Human Rights Tribunals
The abolition of “gatekeeper” human rights commissions in a number of 
provinces since the early 2000s, and the adoption of direct access models, 
has opened a wider door to claims made by employees against unions 
before human rights tribunals (HRTs).57 In theory, claims of union dis-
crimination could have proceeded through the human rights system prior 
to the adoption of direct access models. In practice, however, Commis-
sions typically deferred or dismissed applications from unionized work-
ers, such that very few claims of union discrimination reached human 
rights tribunals.58 The implementation of direct access tribunals has thus 
increased the possibility of overlapping discrimination claims against a 
union, before both a labour board (LRB) and an HRT. 
Discrimination claims come before an LRB through a DFR claim 
that the union discriminated against the claimant, often in tandem with 
additional arguments that the union acted arbitrarily or in bad faith. Be-
cause LRB jurisdiction is broader than that of HRTs, there is some scope 
for parallel proceedings. Where there is overlap, however, it has typically 
been recognized as a zone of concurrent jurisdiction, dealt with through 
principles of res judicata and its legislative equivalents.59 LRBs and HRTs 
56 See cases above note 47.
57 In Ontario, British Columbia and Nunavut, claimants may file claims directly with 
human rights tribunals. In other jurisdictions, claimants must first bring a claim 
to a human rights commission, which usually investigates the matter and decides 
whether to bring the claim forward to adjudication before the tribunal. The Com-
missions in those jurisdictions thus act as gatekeepers. 
58 Etherington, above note 5 at 51–62.
59 In Ontario the HRTO approaches multiple proceedings through s 45 of the Human 
Rights Code, which empowers the Tribunal to defer applications, and s 45.1, which 
permits it to dismiss applications where the underlying substance has been appro-
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also recognize, however, that each has a core of expertise and often defer 
to each other in those areas.
In Gungor, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) explained 
the differences in jurisdiction and role between LRBs and HRTs. LRBs 
have “direct and immediate jurisdiction” to assess the adequacy of a 
union’s representation regarding member’s potential grievances, includ-
ing discrimination grievances.60 LRBs rule only on the process of union 
conduct and decision-making as regards particular grievances, and can 
order that grievances be taken to arbitration for conclusive analysis of 
their merits. But they do not rule on the issue of whether union conduct 
contravened the human rights code. By contrast, HRTs are capable of 
dealing directly with underlying human rights code-related issues raised 
by both the conduct of the employer, and by the conduct of the union in 
providing or failing to provide representation.61 
The Saskatchewan LRB has adopted similar descriptions of its 
jurisdiction in comparison with the Saskatchewan Human Rights Com-
mission and Tribunal.62 In Metz the Board identified questions such as 
whether the employer’s efforts to accommodate the grievor, and wheth-
er the settlement of a grievance complied with the human rights code 
as matters within the primary jurisdiction of the Human Rights Com-
mission. The Board retained jurisdiction, however, over the procedural 
issues relating to the quality of the union’s representation in dealing with 
the accommodation issues.63 
priately dealt with by another proceeding. See Jo-Anne Pickel, “Statutory Tribunals 
and the Challenges of Managing Parallel Claims,” Chapter 6, this volume. The Tri-
bunal considers DFR proceedings, and the settlement of DFR claims, to be “another 
proceeding” for the purposes of s 45.1. See Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H 19, s 
45.1; Dunn v Sault Ste Marie (City), 2008 HRTO 149 (CanLII).
60 Gungor, above note 46 at para 53.
61 Ibid at paras 54–55.
62 Although there are numerous DFR cases that refer to parallel human rights claims 
by the employee, there are only a few in which the human rights claim is still under 
way or has been completed by the time of the DFR hearing, and thus very few in 
which the Board needs to undertake a res judicata and/or jurisdictional analysis. 
See e.g., O’Flaherty v Vancouver Community College Faculty Association, [2011] BCL-
RBD No 7, [2011] BCWLD 2372; DM (Re), [2006] SLRBD No 30, 130 CLRBR (2d) 132 
[DM]; Metz (Re), [2003] SLRBD No 5 [Metz].
63 Metz, ibid at paras 38–63 The Board followed a similar process in DM, ibid, but 
deferred both the substantive and procedural issues to the Tribunal, on the basis 
that an evaluation of the union’s processes required a determination as to whether 
the employee suffered from a disability and the nature of that disability, which the 
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Employees may, of course, opt to by-pass the LRB altogether and bring 
a claim regarding discrimination by their union solely to the HRT. There 
are two types of human rights claims that can be made against unions. 
The first is that the union discriminated against an employee “in employ-
ment” (in Ontario, a violation of section 5 of the Code), or “in membership” 
(in Ontario, a violation of section 6). In Gungor the HRTO explained that 
in claims involving union representation, a union can be found to have 
violated section 5 only if the impugned conduct falls within the two scen-
arios outlined in Renaud.64 In other words, unless a union has participated 
in the creation of a discriminatory term in a collective agreement, or has 
failed to accommodate by impeding an employer’s legitimate accommo-
dation efforts, its conduct is not governed by section 5. However, claims 
that the union has represented a member in a discriminatory fashion may 
constitute a violation of section 6, which prohibits discrimination in re-
spect of membership in a trade union.
The HRTO has been very clear, however, that mere failure to bring 
forward a grievance is not in itself sufficient to find a violation of the 
Code, even where the matter at issue is an allegation of discrimination. To 
make out a prima facie case of discrimination, the employee must dem-
onstrate that the union’s decision not to act was at least in part based on 
a prohibited ground of discrimination. In Traversy the HRTO put it this 
way: “[A] claim that the union violates the Code must be based on an 
assertion of differential treatment, and not simply a failure to act. The 
failure or refusal to take forward a human rights issue such as accom-
modation of a disability in the workplace is not, in and of itself, a breach 
of the Code. . . .There must be a claim, and a factual foundation for the 
claim, that the failure to act was based on discriminatory factors.”65 
Commission was better suited to provide. In DM the Board observed that since the 
employee’s complaints were deferred rather than dismissed, the employee could 
return to the Board if any of the DFR issues were not addressed by the Commission 
(but noted that it may be bound by the Commission’s findings if this occurred). In 
Mallet, above note 47, the CIRB similarly deferred a complaint to the Canadian 
Human Rights Commission, but re-opened it after the Commission had closed the 
file because the applicant did not return calls. 
64 Traversy v Mississauga Professional Firefighters’ Association, 2009 HRTO 996 (CanLII) 
[Traversy]. See also Baylet v Universal Workers Union, 2009 HRTO 700 (CanLII); Gun-
gor, above note 46; Holowka v Ontario Nurses Association, 2010 HRTO 2171 (CanLII); 
Crosby v United Food and Commercial Workers Canada, 2012 HRTO 1158 (CanLII).
65 Traversy, ibid at para 33.
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In Gungor the Tribunal was urged to adopt the standards for union 
conduct outlined by the CIRB in Bingley. The HRTO emphatically de-
clined to do so. Vice-Chair Mark Hart explained that Bingley concerned 
the nature of a union’s representation, not the validity of the underlying 
discrimination grievance sought by the employee. Vice-Chair Hart went 
further to expressly distance the HRTO from the comments made in 
Bingley which suggested that unions may be liable under human rights 
codes simply for failure to challenge employer discrimination.66 In his 
view, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Renaud clearly lim-
ited a union’s duty to accommodate to situations in which it had partici-
pated in the creation of a discriminatory workplace rule or term of the 
collective agreement, or impeded the implementation of a reasonable 
accommodation; the Court did not hold that unions could be held liable 
for failing to take steps to address discrimination in which they did not 
participate in one of these ways. 
Thus preliminary examination of the caselaw suggests that employ-
ees are no more successful before HRTs than they are before LRBs in argu-
ing that their union has discriminated against them. The cases heard by 
HRTs are usually simply claims of unfairness in union decision-making, 
and do not identify a prohibited ground of decision-making. Accordingly, 
they are usually dismissed as being outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. 
C. FURTHER EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IS NEEDED
The previous analysis barely scratches the surface of the questions that 
arise in considering unions’ representational responsibility for human 
rights in the workplace. Although legal principles regarding the DFR (ex-
cept as regards disability) and unions’ direct liability for discrimination 
do not appear to have changed significantly since Weber and Parry Sound, 
there is the general sense that unions have become increasingly sensi-
tized to their human rights obligations over the last few decades. How 
unions approach their representational responsibilities regarding work-
place discrimination, and whether their behaviour has changed since 
Weber and Parry Sound, are questions that cannot be answered except by 
a series of empirical inquiries which I outline in more detail below. 
66 Gungor, above note 46.
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1) The Effects of Concurrency
a) Finality
There are two general justifications for the union veto. The first arises 
from the union’s position as exclusive bargaining representative. The 
veto allows the union control over which issues to negotiate and which 
issues to grieve, giving the union authority to make final decisions in 
the interest of the collective. It also provides the employer with a single 
party capable of making settlements over all workplace disputes, thus al-
lowing the parties to circumscribe the scope of, and bring final resolution 
to their differences. One question that therefore arises under a concur-
rency model is whether, in practice, the concept of finality has become 
effectively illusory. 
Where multiple tribunals have concurrent jurisdiction, courts must 
balance values of finality and fairness. Conflicts between these values 
are typically addressed through the doctrines of res judicata and issue es-
toppel, and/or their statutory counter-parts. 67 The caselaw reveals num-
erous situations in which a union has brought forward but then settled a 
member’s human rights grievance with the employer. The member then 
brings both a DFR claim against the union to an LRB, and a human rights 
claim against the employer, the union, or both, to an HRT. In other cases, 
the union carries the grievance to arbitration, but the affected employ-
ee nonetheless brings a simultaneous DFR claim against the union, and 
a human rights claim against both the union and the employer, on the 
basis of the same or related issues.68 In many DFR cases the employer 
is considered an interested party, and may make submissions. Similar-
ly, unions or employers are often invited to make submissions as inter-
venors in claims at the HRTO in which they have not been named as 
respondents. Where a grievance or DFR case is ongoing, the HRTO may 
defer the application until the other proceeding is concluded, and vice 
versa. However, the existence of concurrent jurisdiction among these tri-
bunals means that the three parties — the employee, the union and the 
employer — are forced to deal with a number of different decision-mak-
ers over the same series of issues.
67 See sources above note 18. 
68 See e.g., Ontario Public Service Employees Union v Ontario (Ministry of Community 
Safety and Correctional Services) (Therrien Grievance) (2008), 173 LAC (4th) 193 
(Arbitrator: Lynk).
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Even though issue estoppel and res judicata principles act to curb 
the full re-litigation of a claim before a second decision-maker, all three 
parties are often required to make argument in a number of fora. In this 
situation, is finality in decision-making still effective? Does it therefore 
continue to be a strong justification for the union veto over the filing and 
processing of grievances? Do unions benefit, or are they harmed by the 
pressures put on them by the union veto in the context of concurrency? 
Would unions instead benefit from simply allowing individual employees 
to bring forward certain types of grievances to arbitration at their own 
cost, as Adell advocated, and let an arbitrator resolve them as between 
the employee and the employer? As discussed, employees can often pro-
ceed directly to human rights decision-makers where the union refuses 
to take forward their discrimination grievance.69 However, in doing so, 
they may forego other collective bargaining entitlements. Examining the 
parties’ experiences in the federal public sector may be instructive here, 
as the Public Sector Labour Relations Act currently permits employees 
to bring certain types of grievances forward to arbitration without their 
union’s assistance.70 A preliminary review suggests that cases brought 
forward by individuals without the support of the union are rarely suc-
cessful.71 But the success rate may ultimately not be the sole criteria to as-
sess. Individual employees may also derive intangible benefits from being 
given the agency to act on their own behalf where the union chooses not 
to do so. DFR and human rights claims against the union might thereby 
be reduced, with a consequent improvement in feelings of satisfaction 
with the union’s representation. 
Further empirical research is required in order to determine whether 
the potential for harm in depriving unions of control, and introducing 
further volatility into relationships with the employer, outweighs the po-
69 This is true in most provinces, although Quebec is an exception. See Renée-Claude 
Drouin, “Some Unique Features of Weber’s Application in Quebec: The Treatment 
of Statutory Labour Rights and Human Rights Claims,” Chapter 9, this volume.
70 See Public Sector Labour Relations Act, SC 2003, c 22, s 2, s 209 [PSLRA]. 
71 Actual tabulation is somewhat difficult because the decisions are not always clear 
as to whether the union declined to support the grievance, or whether the employ-
ee was not unionized at all. The PSLRA permits non-unionized workers access to 
the arbitration process under ss 209(b)–(d). In the federal public sector there is 
a standing tribunal that adjudicates grievances, and employees are therefore not 
required to pay half of the arbitrator’s fee. In the private sector, a requirement to 
contribute to arbitrators’ fees would almost certainly be a significant deterrent to 
individual employees proceeding without union support.
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tential benefits achieved by allowing individuals to bring forward griev-
ances on their own. Assessing the potential of such a reform would require 
a qualitative study of union, employer and employee experiences to assess 
whether and to what extent finality in decision-making has been weak-
ened by concurrency, what impact any potential weakening has on the 
parties’ relationships, what benefits might flow to individual employees, 
and what effects direct access to arbitration for human rights grievances 
might have on the institution of arbitration, and those involved in it. 
b) Union Choices Regarding Adjudication Fora
Decisions in human rights cases brought before HRTs by unionized em-
ployees against employers sometimes imply that unions have been in-
volved at least in a background capacity. Sometimes the union brings the 
claim itself. In other cases it acts as an intervenor on questions related 
to the impact of the decision on the rest of the bargaining unit. Union 
activity may also be visible in cases where, for example, there is an at-
tempt to split a claim, where the union brings a grievance to arbitration 
which does not raise a human rights issue, and the worker then brings a 
separate human rights claim to the Tribunal. (At least in Ontario, such 
strategies have not been successful.72) But in other cases the union’s role 
is less clear, because the decision does not address whether the employee 
is proceeding to the Tribunal against the union’s wishes, or with its tacit 
and/or financial support. 
Another topic for study is therefore the question of when and why 
unions might suggest that a member forego arbitration and instead pro-
ceed directly to the Tribunal. On what basis would a union decide to take 
a claim on a member’s behalf to the Tribunal? Does it do so primarily in 
regards to systemic discrimination claims? Do unions simply act as a 
facilitating resource? Or do they pay for counsel to represent employees 
before the Tribunal? If so, when and how often do they do so? Finally, is 
there a difference in the number of claims brought against unions to the 
HRTs in direct access-model provinces, as compared to those where com-
missions play a gatekeeping function?
72 Paterno v Salvation Army, 2011 HRTO 2298 (CanLII). See also Shilton, above note 6 
at 236.
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2) The DFR
As described above, the predicted heightening of the DFR standard post-
Weber has occurred only in regard to disability discrimination claims, and 
only in some provinces. But questions still remain. Are there more DFR 
claims now than prior to Weber? And if so, is any causal relationship dis-
cernible between expanded arbitral jurisdiction and a rise in DFR claims? 
Even if the legal standards by which union decision-making are judged 
have not greatly changed post-Weber and Parry Sound, have unions 
changed the ways in which they make decisions about whether to bring 
discrimination grievances? Do they, in fact, treat discrimination claims 
as critical job interests, and subject them to a more searching analysis 
than in other types of claims? Have unions placed a higher standard on 
themselves as regards their representational obligations for members’ 
human rights issues over the years? If they do so now, did they also do so 
prior to Weber and Parry Sound? What factors do they consider? And if 
they do, how does this affect their ability to balance the individual rights 
of members and the collective interests of the bargaining unit?
3) Unions’ Obligations in Intra-member Discrimination Scenarios
Finally, how are unions dealing with their representational responsibil-
ities where the discrimination alleged arises between and among union 
members? What do unions do, and what should they do, when one mem-
ber accuses another of sexual harassment, or racism? These problems 
have been under-studied, but pose grave difficulties for unions who are 
obliged to represent members with directly conflicting individual inter-
ests,73 and sharply highlight the difficulties unions face in determining 
what is in the collective interest when significant individual rights issues 
are involved. 
Here the issue is not the union veto per se; both the “accuser” and the 
“accused” may have access to a decision-making forum. The issue is the 
nature of the union’s representational obligations during the process of 
investigation and any subsequent adjudication. In most cases the accus-
er will bring a complaint of discrimination by another employee to her 
employer (although she may also seek the union’s aid in convincing the 
73 Lori Park has written the only study I have located on this issue. See Lori L Park, 
“Fair Representation and Conflict of Interest: Sexual Harassment Complaints Be-
tween Co-Workers” (1997) 6 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 121.
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employer to take appropriate action). Because it is the employer’s legal 
responsibility to provide a discrimination-free workplace, the employer 
should investigate, and may then take disciplinary action against the ac-
cused employee. If disciplinary action is taken, the union must then de-
termine how to apportion its representational duties to both the accuser 
and accused. If no disciplinary action is taken, it must then determine 
whether it will launch a human rights grievance on behalf of the accuser, 
and how it will represent the accused in that scenario. 
Practices seem to vary widely among unions and within collective 
agreements. Some unions have processes in place to appoint a represent-
ative for each employee, with a firewall between the representatives to 
ensure confidentiality. In some instances, unions will pay for one party 
to secure independent counsel, while directly representing the other. 
Other unions have negotiated for the creation of joint union-manage-
ment investigation processes, in which each party appoints an external 
representative to investigate the allegations. In some situations, however, 
the union will represent only the disciplined member, on the assumption 
that the accuser’s interests are aligned with the employer’s. This last ap-
proach has serious pitfalls, since the employer’s interest is ultimately to 
avoid liability. Unless specific policies or contract terms so provide, the 
employer is not obliged to keep employees informed of more than the 
very broad outlines of the progress of the complaint. If the union does not 
provide representational services, the employee who has lodged the com-
plaint will have no mechanism to contest the process of the investigation, 
and will be beholden solely to the employer for information about who is 
appointed to investigate, who is contacted for information, what material 
has been provided to the accused, etc. — all information the employer 
may not wish to share. She may find therefore find herself effectively in 
the dark, as a process unfolds that directly affects her. In addition, given 
that discrimination claims are usually brought by members with less-
er socioeconomic power — women, racialized workers, sexual minority 
employees, etc. — the union may be perceived as disinterested in the ex-
periences of its more vulnerable members, which may in turn give rise to 
serious morale issues within the bargaining unit. 
Very little research has been done investigating union practices in 
intra-member discrimination claims, and these practices are rarely vis-
ible in the caselaw. Given the potential difficulties in such cases, however, 
further investigation of unions’ experiences with different models would 
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be highly instructive in determining what practices are currently used, 
and what “best practices” should be promoted and developed. 
 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
This essay has raised questions for further study of the ways in which 
unions undertake their representational obligations in regards to human 
rights disputes in the workplace since Weber was issued. As the preceding 
discussion suggests, the relevant caselaw is not greatly instructive. At a 
general level, it arguably establishes a higher standard for applying the 
DFR in regards to disability discrimination, but not beyond. And the hu-
man rights tribunals have remained faithful to the limited scope of union 
liability elaborated in Renaud. 
The reported decisions of LRBs and HRTs suggest little reason for 
concern that unions are not doing their job in connection with enforce-
ment of employee human rights. Most claims filed against unions appear 
unmeritorious. Their facts usually reflect employees who are frustrated 
and unhappy with all parties in the workplace, but do not usually re-
veal any inappropriate action (or inaction) by the union. In these cases, 
unions appear to take seriously their obligations to investigate and as-
sess the merits of a grievance, and its effects on the collective. But we 
know little about the underlying reasons why the caselaw reflects this 
picture. It may simply be that unions have, by and large, internalized and 
expanded their human rights obligations and are properly representing 
their members as regards workplace discrimination issues. Or it may be 
that where a union has acted arbitrarily or discriminatorily in refusing 
to bring forward a discrimination grievance, the case settles prior to ad-
judication, in either forum. Finally, it may also be that unionized workers 
who experience inappropriate recalcitrance by their unions in regards to 
a discrimination grievance are too powerless or too disillusioned to bring 
additional claims. 
I suspect all three scenarios have some validity. Most unions are 
cognizant of the weight of their obligations in regards to important in-
dividual rights held by their members, and have been so at least since 
Weber, if not before. Most unions try to balance individual human rights 
interests against the needs of the collective. When meritorious claims 
arise, it is likely that the parties often settle prior to adjudication, wheth-
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er the claims are framed as DFR claims or human rights claims. But there 
are also likely to be some workplaces that continue to be characterized 
by a culture of systemic discrimination. We simply do not know from the 
caselaw how well employees in those workplaces have been served by 
expanded arbitral jurisdiction. 
It remains to be assessed, however, whether concurrent jurisdiction 
among arbitrators, LRBs and HRTs is the answer. If parallel cases are per-
mitted in multiple forums on essentially the same issue, we need further 
empirical study on whether finality continues to have meaning, whether 
it continues to have value for workplace parties, and whether it justifies 
the union veto. Thus a host of questions remain to be answered to discover 
whether and to what extent Weber and Parry Sound have had real impact 
on unions’ approaches to their representational obligations regarding 
workplace discrimination. If, as the Supreme Court of Canada has noted, 
human rights in the workplace are “everybody’s business,” there is still 
much we do not know about the effects of Weber and Parry Sound on the 
ways in which unions are managing their part of that business.74
74 Renaud, above note 25 at para 44. See also Shilton, above note 6 for an analysis of 
Renaud and its impact on unions. 
